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March 24, 1969
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD

ABM:

(n.,

MOJI.TTANA)

The Focus of the Proposal

As the Senate begins its evaluation, the features of President
Nixon's new proposal for the ABM system ought to be seen in proper focus.
It was evident from the press conference on March 14, for example, that
the President's basic dec is ion changed the earlier concept of the ABM
system.

Last year the ABM was billed as affording protection primarily

to the cities against a Chinese attack and onlv incidentally, as safeguarding emplaced ICBM missile-sites in rural areas.

This year the President

proposes to shift the emphasis of protection 180 degrees, from the cities
to the rural ICBM-sites.

This change was explicit in the President's press

conference and it was clear in the presentation to the Congressional leaders
at the 1Vhi te House prior to the press conference.
Since then, other briefings have been provided to amplif;r the
President's decision.

These subsequent statements by the officials of

the Defense Department seem to me to be confusing the emphasis which the
President had set forth in his new approach.
President Nixon's proposal was to limit the actual deployment
of the ABM system at this point to missile farms in Montana and North
Dakota.

Indeed, it was evident that he was hopeful that negotiations

with the Soviet Union might make even the completion of this limited
deployment unnecessary.

The President specifically reserved until a

later review any decision for elaboration of the proposed system

be~rond
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the initial two-site installation.

The President put off, until this

future review, any extension of the system--vrhether to provide for a
"thin" coverage against Chinese attacks or to counter an accidental
missile firing from abroad which might destroy one or more cities.
Insofar as protection of people against a massive Soviet first-strike,
that was rejected outright by President Nixon as it had been rejected by
the previous Administration.
Such was the emphasis given by the President in his new approach.
Defense Department interpretations have tended to obfuscate, it seems to me,
the restraint which characterized the President's decision.

These subse-

quent statements leave the strong impression that t he two-site installations
are just the beginning of a vas·t program to convert the entire nation into
a missile Maginot.

It is as if future revievs of the int ernational situa-

tion which the President has stressed he would make prior to any further
elaboration of the system Ifill be nothing more than some sort of charade
for the benefit of those vho have had grave concern about the entire enterprise from the outset.
As a courtesy to the President, I have endeavored to keep an
open mind on the new approach.

The Senate knows that I have opposed the

original ABM proposal in the past, not only during the first few days of
the Nixon Administration, but also throughout the
Johnson Administration.

closin~

years of the

For me, there is not now and there has never been

any partisanship in this issue.

As I have opposed the Sentinel program

during two admin1strations of different politicalleadershl..p, it has been
opposed in the same fashion by other Members on both sides of the aisle.
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In this connection, I would refer to the leadership of the distinguished
Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Coop er) and the contributions of

other Repub-

lican Senators.
To infer part isanship where none exists do es a disservice to the
Senate and to the count ry.

Before judgment on this issue is taken , all

Senat ors will insist, as I will insist, upon the most thorough discussion .
We are deciding here not for a day but for years and, perhaps, decades.
vlho doubts that Senators will not form their conclusions on the basis of
understanding and conviction rather than on the basis of party considerations?

Members of t he SenA t e would be well advised to put aside talk of

partisanship.

There is no partisanship and I would hope and expect that

there will be no pettiness with respect to this critical issue .
It would be

my

hope , too, that subordinates in the Administration

will not read into the President's decision their own preconceptions and
predilections.

The President has made clear tha t he has not gone beyond

a fixed point of decision and he will not go beyond it without subsequent
review of the shifting nature of securit y needs.

His subordinates in t he

Defense Department --whe t her political or bureaucratic--ought to be the
firs t to hear and heed him.

vlhen he say s t hat he will decide not now but

in the future, whether the situation at t hat time justifies curtailment,
expansion or any ot her modification of the initial deployment, he should
be taken at his word.
It should b e borne in mind, too, that we are in a most difficult
period in Viet Nam and at home.

We are in a time of growing financial

s t ress among the tax-squeezed , inflation-pressed p eople of t his nation.

- 4 It is of the utmost importance

tha-~

there not be lost any opportunity to

bring under control the immense and growing cost of armaments to this nation.
Negotiations with the Soviet Union, which the President has made clear he
intends to pursue, might conceivably act to curb those costs.
Frankly, I do not know whether agreements can be achieved with
our principal rival in this wasteful military competition.

I do not believe ,

however, that it enhances the prospects for agreement whel:l non-elected
officials of this government play one-upmanship with limited Presidential
decisions.

Nor does it strengthen the prospects for agreement if the

rationale which is set forth in order to justify deployment of the ABM
gives the appearance of a missile system in search of a mission.

That has

been the effect of the flailing efforts to push this sy;stem through the
Congress over the past several years.

The country has been saturated with

a propaganda that has not only puzzled our own people but which may well
have exposed the nation to international ridicule.

First, it was urged

that the Sentinel system be adopted on the grounds that it would protect
Americans against the Russians.

ThenJ when it was t ransparent that nothing

could protect the people of the nation against massive Soviet attack, the
system was labeled a defense of the inhabitants of the cities --a thin
defense--against the irrational Chinese.

Finally, it was termed a defense

against both the Russians and the Chinese and even against accidental
missile firings.

Indeed, is it any wonder that there are grave doubts,

now, as to whether an ABM system can protect this nation against anyone?

- 5 That is another point, however, and I will take it up at another
time.

I wish to stress now that the system which President Nixon has

proposed be built this year is for the protection of a segment of a segment
of our deterrent power--350 Minuteman missi l es in Montana and North Dakota.
That is not a protection against Chinaj it is a protection of a small part
of our capacity to retaliate against an attack from the

S~iet

Union.

By

the same token, therefore, it is with Russia that disarmament agreements
which might make possible the forestalling of the immensely costly placement of the ABM's might have relevance.

If, instead what is proposed for

this year is to cement in a plan for a mixed system--a polyglot ABM--to
protect all of t he ICBM deterrent power of the United States, to protect
against China, to protect against third parties or to protect against
accidental attacks or to protect against whatever, then what sense would
it make, as it is obviously contemplated, to ta lk disarmament with the
Russians but not with the Chinese?
China or against accidental missiles

Do you disarm a defense system against
because you have negotiated an arms

agreement with the Soviet Union?
\{hat I am suggesting, Mr. President, is that it is at least possible
to find a rationale in the association of a two -site ABM installation and
negotiations with the Russians on arms limitation.

President Nixon linked

these two considerations in shifting from the previous ABM concept.

I fear,

however, that subsequent interpretation by his subordinates is rapidly
dismantling the connection.

To be sure, there is a certain ritual deference

paid to the disarmament aspect of the President ' s approach but any perusal of
the record to date will show that the emphasis has clearly shifted so that the
two -site installations appear to be coming into focus as a mere wayside stop
along the road to the construction of a great nuclear wall whose costs would
be incalculable.

- 6 It seems to me, therefore, that we need to know whether the presumption upon which the Defense Department now seems to be acting is valid-that is, that an open-eDded deployment of an area defense system aimed in
any and all directions is a foregone conclusion.

I thought the President

had not decided that point--that he had decided at this time only to deploy
AEM's at two sites.

I thought the President was trying to keep open an

option which would permit him to restrain the costly spread of the system
at that point or even to reverse it.

to be closing off that option.

The interpretations seem to me, however,

How are we to explain, otherwise, the effort

which is being made by the Defense Department to obtain appropriations from
the Senate, for example, to purchase, this year, land for several ABM sites
beyond those in Montana and North Dakota?

These purchases would have no

purpose other than to set in motion an elaboration which President Nixon
presumably has not yet decided.

vJhat justification can there be for appro-

priating this year for a need which may not exist next year?

Indeed, the

Department's request for this money seems to me presumptuous of the intent
of both the President and the Congress.
The basic focus of this discussion on the ABM, then, if I may sum
up, ought to be on what President Nixon has proposed to begin to do this
year:

that is, to provide ABM's to protect 350 Minuteman ICBM missiles in

Montana and North Dakota while trying to move ahead, at the same time, with
the
negotiations with/Russians on curbing the armaments-competition. Whether
even that limited ABM deployment is justified is another matter.

That will

have to be considered in the light of the reliability, redundance and the
relevance of any ABM deployment at this time.

It will have to be discussed

in the light of the immense costs, actual and potential.

It will have to

be decided, finally, on the basis of the need to balance the requirements

-

. '

- 7 of external security against the

re~uirements

of the nation's internal security in

for halting the disintegration

all of its ramifications .

I shall have more to say on this subject, Mr. President, at a
subsequent date.

.·
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e.ru1 war. We owe ounclveo~, we owe the ruture, a heavy obllga.t1on to tcy.

ABM: THE FOCUS OF THE

PROPOSAL
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, a.s
the Senate begins its evaluation of the
ABM system, the features of President
Nixon's new proposal for this system
ought to be seen in proper focus.
May I say that I make this speech
today with due respect to the dimculties
which confronted the President of the
United States when he thought about a
drastic changeover in the configuration
of the Safeguard system from what had
previously been known as the Sentinel
system, which he had inherited from a
Democratic administration.
May I say, also, that I appreciated the
!rankne.ss with which the President of
the United States discussed this matter
with the joint leadership on the day he
also later discussed it with the people of
America by means of a TV broadcast, at
which time he outlined his views and
gave his reasons and opened hl.m.self up
to questions on the part of the communications media.
At that meeting, when the President
told us of the decision, he asked for our
reaction. I must admit, In all candor,
that the reaction among those present
was aimost unanimously in support of
what he had stated he was going to do.
But, with equal candor, I must say that
one or two of us expressed our doubts
and stated that we had serious questions
relative to cost, rellabllity, alternatives,
need, and other factors. He understood
perfectly that this was a matter which
could be from two, if not more, sides,
and he stated that he did not call the
leadership down to fonn a cheerleaders'
section to get behind him, but to tell us
his views and, in return, to get o ur
reaction.
The President had a most d.l.ftl.cult decision to face up to. I give him great
credit for being responsible-solely responsible-for the review which he requested on the Sentinel system. I give
him credit--;!'reat credit-for facing up
to his responsibility as President of the
United States and arriving at a decision.
I have no doubt in my mind that his
decision was based on what he considered to be in the best interests of the
Nation as a whole.
I did not attend the meetings at which
the Secretary of Defense and his advisers--Under Secretary Packard, General Wheeler, and Dr. Foster- appeared
before the appropriate committees; but
I did read the newspaper accounts with
· a great deal of interest, and I also happened to be lucky enough to view certain
portions of their appearance before the
Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations.
I want to give Secretary Laird great
credit, also, for the way he presented his
case, for the vigor he showed in marshaling his facts and in answering the variety
of questions which were directed to him
from all directions.
But I do think, Mr. President, that this
matter should be viewed in proper focus,
a n d I anticipate that the Safeguard antiballistic-missile system will be the sub-
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ject of thoroughgoing and extended
debate In t.uo body.
It was evident !rom the press conference on March 14, for example, that
the President's basic decision changed
the earlier concept of the ABM system.
Last year the ABM was billed as affordIng protection primarily to the cities
against a Chinese attack and only incidentally as safeguarding emplaced
ICBM missile sites in rural areas. This
year the President proposes to shift the
emphasis of protection 180 degrees, from
the clUes to the rural ICBM sites. This
change was explicit in the President's
press conference, and it was clear in the
presentation to the congressional leaders
at the White House prior to the press
conference.
Since then, other briefings have been
provided to amplify the President's decision. These subsequent statements by
the officials of the Defense Department
seem to me to be confusing the emphasis
which the President had set forth in his
new approach.
President Nixon's proposal was to limit
the actual deployment of the ABM system at this point to missile farms In
Montana and North Dakota. Indeed, It
was evident that he was hopeful that
negotiations with the Soviet Union might
make even the completion of this llm1ted
deployment unnecessary. The President
specifically reserved until a. later review
any decision for elaboration of the proposed system beyond the initial two-site
installation. The President put off, until
this future review, any extension of the
system-whether to provide for a "thin"
coverage against Chinese attacks or to
counter an accidental missile firing from
abroad which might destroy one or more
cities. Insofar as protection of people
against a massive Soviet first strike, that
was rejected outright by President Nixon,
as It had been rejected by the previous
administration.
Such was the emphasis given by the
President in his new approach. Defense
Department interpretations h«Ve tended
to obfuscate, it seems to me, the restraint
which characterized the President's decision. These subsequent statements leave
the strong impression that the two-site
installations are just the beginning of a
vast program to convert the entire Nation into a missile mag!not. It is as if
future reviews o! the international situation which the President has stressed
he would make prior to any further
elaboration of the system will be nothing
more than some sort o! charade for the
benefit of those who have had grave concern about the entire enterprise !rom the
outset.
As a courtesy to the President, I have
endeavored to keep an open mind on the
new approach. The Senate knows that
I have opposed the original ABM proposal in the past, not only during the first
fC'w days of the Nixon administration,
but also throughout the closing years of
the Johnson administration. For me,
there Is not now and there has never been
any partisanship in this if.sue. As I have
opposed the Sentinel program during
two administrations of different political
leadership, it has been opposed in the
same fashion by other Members on both
sides of the aisle. In this connection, I

would refer to the leadership of the di.st!ngul.shed Senator from Kentucky <Mr.
CoOPER) and the contributions of other
Republican Senators.
To infer partisanship where none exists
does a disservice to the Senate and to
the country. Before judgment on this
issue is taken, all Senators will insist,
as I will insist, upon the most thorough
discussion. We are deciding here not for
a day but for years and, perhaps, decades. Who doubts that Senators will not
form their conclusions on the basis of
understanding and conviction rather
than on the basis of party considerations? Members of the Senate would be
well advised to put aside talk of partisanship. There is no partisanship and I
would hope and expect that there will be
no pettiness with respect to this critical
issue.
It would be roy hope, too, that subordinates in the administration will not
read into the President's decision their
own preconceptions and predilections.
The President has made clear that he
has not gone beyond a fixetl point of decision and he will not go beyond it without subsequent review of the shifting
nature of security needs. His subordinates in the Defense Departmentwhether political or bureaucratic-ought
to be the first to hear and heed him.
When he says that he will decide not now
but in the future, whether the situation
at that time justifies curtailment, expansion or any other modification of the
initial deployment, he should be taken
at his word.
It should be borne in mind, too, that
we are in a most di.ffi.cult period in Vietnam and at home. We are in a time of
growing financial stress among the taxsqueezed, inflation-pressed people of this
Nation.
It is of the utmost Importance that
there not be lost any opportunity to
bring under control the immense and
growing cost of armaments to this Nation. Negotiations with-the Soviet Union,
which the President has made clear he
intends to pursue, might conceivably act
to curb those costs.
Frankly, I do not know whether agreementa can be achieved with our principal rival in this wasteful military competition. I do not believe, however, that
it enhances the propects for agreement
when nonelected officials of this Government play one-upmanship with l!m1ted
presidential decisions. Nor does it
strengthen the pros~cts for agreement
if the rationale which Is set forth in order
to justify deployment of the ABM gives
the appearance of a missile system in
search of a m1sslon, to quote the words
of the Senator from Tennessee (Mr.
GoRE). That has been the effect of the
flailing efforts to push this system
through the Congress over the past several years. The country has been saturated with & propaganda that has not
only puzzled our own people but which
may well have exposed the Nation to International ridicule. First, It was urged
that the Sentinel system be adopted on
the grounds that it would protect Americans against the Russians. Then, when
It was transparent that nothing could
protect the people of the Nation against
massive Soviet attack, the system was
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labeled a. defense of the inhabitants of
the cities-a thin defense--against the
irrational Chinese. Finally, it was termed
a. defense against both the Russians and
the Chinese and even against accidental
missile firings. Indeed, Is It any wonder
that there are grave doubts, now, as to
whether an ABM system can protect this
Nation against anyone?
That is another point, however, and I
will take it up at another time. I wish to
stress now that the system which President Nixon has proposed be built this
year is for the protection of a segment of our deterrent power-350
Minuteman missiles in Montana and
North Dakota. That is not a protection
against China; It is a protection of a
small part of our capacity to retaliate
against an attack from the Sov1et UnIon. By the same token, therefore, It is
with Russia that disarmament agreementa which might make possible the
forestalling of the immensely costly
placement of the ABM's might have relevance. If, instead what Is proposed for
this year is to cement in a plan for a
mixed system-a polyglot ABM-to protect all of the ICBM deterrent power of
the United States, to protect against
China, to protect against third parties or
to protect against accidental attacks or
to protect against whatever, then what
sense would It make, as It is obviously
contemplated, to talk dlsannament with
the Russ1ans but not with the Chinese?
Do you disarm a defense system, Mr.
President, against China or against accidental missiles because you have negotiated an arms agreement with the Soviet
Union?
What I am suggesting, Mr. President,
is that it Is at least possible to find a rationale in the association of a two-site
ABM installation and negotiations with
the Russians on arms l!m1tation. President Nixon linked these two considerations in shifting from the previous ABM
concept. I fear, however, that subsequent
interpretation by his subordinates Is rap_
idly dismantling the connection. To be
sure, there is a certain ritual deference
paid to the disarmament aspect of the
President's approach but any perusal of
the record to date will show that the emphasis has clearly shifted so that the
two-site installations appear to be comIng into focus as a mere wayside stop
along the road to the construction of a
great nuclear wall whose costa would be
Incalculable.
It seems to me, therefore, that we need
to know whether the presumption upon
which the Defense Department now
seems to be acting is valid-that is, that
an open-ended deployment of an area
defense system aimed in any and all directions is a foregone conclusion. I
thought the President had not decided
that point-that he had decided at this
time only to deploy ABM's at two sites. I
thought the President was trying to keep
open an option which would permit him
to restrain the costly spread of the system at that point or even to reverse it.
The interpretations seem 'to me, however, to be closing off that option. How
are we to explain, otherwise, the effort
which may well be made by the Defense
Department to obtain approprlationa
from the Senate, for example, to pur-
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chase land, this year, for several ABM
sites beyond t hose In Montana and North
Dakota?
It is my understanding that last year
Congress appropriated $227.3 million for
acquisition of land and construction;
tl1at is, brick and mortA.r items. It is my
further understanding that about onethird of that money has been spent. It is
my further understanding that the law
can well be interpreted so that the remaining two-thirds, or approximately
$150 million, is available and spendable
with no restrictions whatsoever because
when the appropriation was made it was
open ended or "no ended," however one
wishes to refer to it. So it may well be
tha t there will be no request for funds
this year because of the two-thirds of
$227.3 million appropriated for this fiscal
year being available and ready to be
spent.
·
Incidentally, speaking of construction, I
wonder what is going to happen to the
sites which have been bought in the
vicinity of Boston, and very likely, in
other parts of the country as well, which
because of the change from Sentinel to
Safeguard now no longer have the purpose intended for them when the purchase was originally made. These purchases, beyond Montana and North
Dakota, would have no purpose other
than to set in motion an elaboration
which President Nixon presumably has
not yet decided. What justification can
there be for appropriating or expending
moneys ava:.lable this year for a need
which may not exist next year?
Indeed, the Department's request for
this money seems to me to be presumptuous of the intent that both the President
and the Congress had in mind.
The basic focus of this discussion on
the ABM, then, if I may sum up, ought
to be on what President Nixon has proposed to begin to do this year: that is,
to provide ABM's to protect 350 Minuteman ICBM missiles in Montana and
North Dakota while trying to move
ahead, at the same time, with •negotiations with the Russians on curbing the
armaments competition. Whether even
that limited ABM deployment is justified
1s another matter. That will have to be
considered in the light of the reliablllty,
redundance, and the relevance of any
ABM deployment at this time. It will
have to be discussed in the light of the
immense costs. actual and potential. It
will have to be decided, finally, on the
basis of the need to balance the requirements of external security against the
requirements for halting the disintegration of the nation's internal security in
all of its ramifications.
I shall have more to say on this subJect, Mr. President, at a subsequent date.
But at this time, I ask unanimous consent
that the transcript of the President's
news conference of March 14, published
in the New York Times on March 15,
1969, having to do with foreign and
domestic affairs, be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection. the transcript Wa.l! ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
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